This paper introduces idiosyncratic …rm e¢ ciency shocks into a continuous-time general equilibrium model of trade with heterogeneous …rms. The presence of sunk export entry costs and e¢ ciency uncertainty gives rise to hysteresis in export market participation. A …rm will enter into the export market once it achieves a given size, re ‡ecting its e¢ ciency, but may keep exporting even after its e¢ ciency has fallen below its initial entry level. Some exporters will not be selling as much in the domestic market as other …rms that never entered the foreign market. The model captures the qualitative features of …rm birth, growth, export market entry and exit, and death found in the empirical literature. We calibrate the model to match relevant statistics of …rms'turnover and export dynamics in the United States, and show that the mode of globalization (a reduction in sunk costs as opposed to overhead costs), matters for a …rm's selection and persistence in export status. Trade liberalization via a reduction in sunk export entry costs reduces a …rm's export status persistence, while the opposite happens when liberalization takes place through a reduction in overhead export costs.
Introduction
In recent years many studies have highlighted the importance of producer heterogeneity in international trade. On average, the most productive …rms are those that engage in exporting activities, a …nding that suggests substantial hurdles exist in accessing the foreign market. 1 Moreover, …rms perform very di¤erently after entering the export market: while a large fraction of new exporters stop exporting within a year of their entry, those new exporters that survive are very likely to thrive. 2 Heterogeneity in export performance also reveals itself through the fact that cohorts of exporters di¤er in their performance over the years, with leapfrogging in size and productivity occurring. Despite this heterogeneity, a …rm's trade status is very persistent. Roberts and Tybout (1997) , using data on Colombian plants, found that sunk entry costs are signi…cant and a …rm's prior experience increases its probability of exporting by as much as 60 percentage points. Bernard and Jensen (2004a) , using data for U.S. plants, Campa (2004) using data on Spanish …rms, and Bernard and Wagner (2001) using data on German …rms, all …nd a large degree of persistence in a …rm's export status. 3 Moreover, Bernard and Jensen (2004b) show that U.S. …rms start and stop exporting at di¤erent productivity levels, with exporters exiting at a productivity level one-third below the productivity level at which they start exporting. Finally, Bernard et al. (2003) show that although the productivity distribution of U.S. exporters stochastically dominates that of nonexporters, the two distributions overlap for a large part of the productivity support, thus suggesting the presence of low-productivity exporters and highproductivity nonexporting …rms. This paper provides a new model which rationalizes the above facts. Our framework is similar to Melitz (2003) but instead of assuming that a …rm's e¢ ciency remains constant over time, we suppose that it evolves over the life of the …rm as a consequence of the realization of a Brownian motion stochastic process. In order to enter a foreign market …rms need to pay a sunk entry cost. Due to the presence of sunk costs and uncertainty, the decision to start or stop exporting can be analyzed following the literature on investment under uncertainty (e.g. Dixit 1989 , Dixit and Pindyck 1994) . Entrepreneurs make investments to set up …rms and draw their initial e¢ ciency level from a common distribution. Thereafter, e¢ ciency evolves over time according to a Brownian motion. Production for the domestic market starts even if pro…ts are negative and continues until the expected net present value of pro…ts and the value of the option to start exporting are high enough. If the …rm's e¢ ciency exceeds an endogenously determined threshold, it then becomes pro…table to enter the foreign market by paying a sunk cost. This entry cost has to be paid every time a …rm starts or resumes exporting. If, later on, e¢ ciency falls below the initial level at which the …rm had started exporting, the entrepreneur will prefer to keep exporting as long as the net present value of exporting pro…ts plus the value of the option to stop exporting is larger than the value of being a nonexporter. In other words, the presence of uncertainty and sunk export entry costs introduces an option value in the decision to enter or exit the export market. Current exporters wait longer to leave the export market in order to avoid repaying the entry cost later on, though this choice comes at the expense of enduring periods of negative (export) pro…ts. Similarly, nonexporters wait for higher e¢ ciency levels before entering the export market. Overall, export participation is characterized by hysteresis. 4 There is a range of e¢ ciency levels where the optimal decision is to stick with the status quo: nonexporters decide not to enter the export market and exporters decide not to leave it. In the irreversibility literature (e.g. Dixit 1989 , Dixit and Pyndick 1994) this is known as the band of inaction. We extend Dixit's 1989 model, which considers the decision of entry and exit from an industry when prices are stochastic. In our model we consider the export market entry and exit decision in a general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous …rms. Uncertainty and the sunk costs of exporting are also present in Roberts and Tybout (1997) . They developed a dynamic discrete-choice model that expresses each plant's current exporting status as a function of its previous exporting experience, its observable characteristics a¤ecting future pro…ts from exporting, and unobserved serially correlated shocks. More recently, Das et al. (2007) develop and estimate a partial equilibrium dynamic structural model of export supply with plant-level heterogeneity in export pro…ts, market entry costs and uncertainty. All in all, our model, maintaining these same three elements, embeds these models into a fully- ‡edged general-equilibrium framework.
Our paper is related to Luttmer (2007) . We extend his industry dynamics framework to allow …rms to compete in the international market and we retain his prediction that the …rm size distribution is Pareto in the upper tail and increasing in the lower tail. In addition, our model also implies that the distribution of exporters'sales into a foreign market is Pareto in the upper tail and increasing in the lower tail. This result is consistent with recent evidence by Eaton et al. (2011) . Using data from France they report that export sales distributions behave similarly to a Pareto distribution in the upper tail and more like a lognormal distribution in the lower tail, independent of market size and the extent of French participation. Export sales distributions are therefore similar to the overall …rm size distribution (e.g. Axtell 2001 , Luttmer 2007 . Unlike in Luttmer's 2007 model, the case of two (or more) trading economies requires decomposing the stationary e¢ ciency distribution in two parts: one for exporters and the other one for nonexporters. When the underlying uncertainty follows a standard Brownian motion the e¢ ciency distributions of exporters and nonexporters overlap along the band of inaction: the most e¢ cient nonexporters lie to the right of (i.e. are more e¢ cient than) the least e¢ cient exporters.
Our paper is also related to Arkolakis (2010) , where the author introduces per consumer access costs to explain the presence of "small" exporters. In Melitz (2003) , less e¢ cient …rms can enter the foreign market and sell small amounts only if the export overhead cost is small relatively to the size of the destination market. In our model, the presence of an export sunk cost (on top of the overhead cost) makes it more di¢ cult for incumbent exporters to leave the foreign market. Therefore, we o¤er a di¤erent but complementary rationale for the existence of small exporters even when their overhead costs are high. These are exporters that entered the export market and experienced larger initial export sales, but then su¤ered a sequence of negative e¢ ciency shocks that reduced sales-but not to the point of triggering exit from the export market. This pattern is due to the hysteresis e¤ect and is consistent with the evidence, mentioned above, provided in Bernard and Jensen (2004b) , as well as with Eaton et al. (2008) , who …nd that on a year-to-year basis a substantial fraction of Colombian exporters switch to lower export quintiles, without stopping to export.
Finally, other papers have introduced dynamics into a model of trade with heterogeneous …rms. Ghironi and Melitz (2005) incorporated heterogeneous …rms into a two country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study the e¤ects of aggregate shocks on the size of the traded sector and the composition of consumption baskets in both countries. Aggregate shocks induce …rms to enter and exit, which results in changes to the composition of the consumption basket over time. In contrast to our model, …xed costs occur per period and, therefore, there is no band of inaction. Closer to our model Alessandria and Choi (2012) develop a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous …rms, sunk export costs, and persistent idiosyncratic productivity shocks to assess the quantitative e¤ects of a tari¤ reduction on welfare, trade, and export participation. By devising the model in discrete time they cannot provide closed-form solutions for the stationary size distribution of exporters and nonexporters. Costantini and Melitz (2008) , Atkeson and Burstein (2010) , and Impullitti and Licandro (2010) focus on the …rm's joint decision to export and innovate, thus endogenizing the dynamics of productivity.
In the second part of the paper we calibrate the model to match relevant statistics of …rms' turnover and export dynamics for the U.S. economy, and explore its properties numerically. First, this exercise allows us to provide an estimate of the sunk and overhead costs of exporting, which turn out to be in line with those estimated by Das et al. (2007) using Colombian data. Second, the calibration allows us to quantify the band of inaction, and study how it is a¤ected by di¤erent globalization scenarios. We focus on the reduction in two di¤erent types of …xed trade costs, the sunk export entry cost and the overhead (per-period, on-going) export cost, and discuss the implications of these di¤erent modes of globalization for …rms'selection into the export market, the persistence in export status, and the new exporters' margin of trade liberalization.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic set-up, solves for the stationary e¢ ciency distributions by export status, and describes the equilibrium. Section 3 performs a quantitative analysis, based on U.S. data, of the model and focuses on a …rm's persistence in export status. Finally, section 4 concludes.
Model

Basic Set-up
In this section we introduce the basic features of the model. We de…ne preferences, technology, trade costs, market structure, and we determine the optimal pricing behavior.
Demand. Time is continuous and starts at t = 0. There are two symmetric countries, each populated by a measure L of in…nitely lived agents. Consumers in each country maximize utility derived from the consumption of goods from one sector, characterized by a continuum of di¤erentiated goods. Utility comes from the consumption of a composite good C and is equal to
where > 0 is the discount rate. 5 The composite good is a CES aggregator of the set c of di¤erentiated varieties c available in equilibrium:
where > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. When the composite good is used as the numéraire, the interest rate is constant and given by r = . Aggregate consumption (and wages) do not grow in the steady state. A positive interest rate ensures that the present value of aggregate expenditure and aggregate labor income is …nite and that utility is …nite. Since varieties symmetrically enter the utility function, demand for a variety depends (only) on its price p, c(p) = Cp : 5 Since we focus on the analysis of the steady state and we do not introduce aggregate growth in the model, we now drop the time subscript whenever possible in order to simplify the notation.
Each consumer is endowed, at every point in time, with one unit of labor which is supplied inelastically to …rms and receives a wage w. The representative consumer faces a standard present value budget constraint.
Technology, trade barriers, and optimal pricing. Creating a …rm requires an initial investment in the form of a sunk cost E , expressed in units of labor. Goods are produced using only labor. A …rm is de…ned by its unique access to a technology for producing a particular di¤erentiated commodity. Firm technology is represented by a cost function that exhibits a constant marginal cost with a …xed overhead cost. At age a, a …rm uses l a = c=e za + 0 units of labor to produce c units of a di¤erentiated good. The (labor) e¢ ciency level of the …rm at age a is denoted by z a . An existing …rm can only continue at a cost equal to 0 units of labor per unit of time. The …rm must exit if this ‡ow cost is not paid, and any exit is irreversible. After sustaining the entry cost E , the …rm draws an initial random unit log labor e¢ ciency from a distribution g(z). For pure expositional purposes, we present the model under the assumption that all new …rms enter with the same e¢ ciency level, denoted with z. Firms can sell their product only on the domestic market or also export it. An exporter faces three types of trade barriers: a variable cost , a per period cost 1 , and an up-front cost I. The variable cost takes the form of an "iceberg cost": > 1 units of the good must be shipped in order for one unit of the good to arrive in the other country. The additional cost 1 has to be paid every period by an exporting …rm. Think of 1 as the cost of maintaining a presence in the foreign market, including minimum freight and insurance charges, and the costs of monitoring foreign customs procedures and product standards. The cost I has to be sunk up-front every time a …rm starts or resumes exporting. It represents expenses like the cost of establishing distribution channels, learning bureaucratic procedures, developing a marketing strategy, and adapting products and packaging for the foreign market. Both the per period cost and the up-front cost are expressed in units of labor. Unlike in Melitz (2003) , these two trade costs play di¤erent roles in our model, as it will become clear below.
Firms operate in monopolistically competitive markets, and apply a standard Dixit-Stiglitz markup on marginal costs. The optimal domestic price of a …rm with e¢ ciency z a is
while the export price is equal to the domestic price multiplied by a factor . Let j denote the status of a …rm (0 for a nonexporter; 1 for an exporter). The ‡ow pro…ts (i.e. gross of …xed costs) of a nonexporter are~
where X = w (1 ) C=w, can be interpreted as a proxy for market size. The ‡ow pro…ts of an exporter with e¢ ciency z a are~ 1 (z a ) = (1 + 1 )~ 0 (z a ). It will be convenient, below, to re-express the ‡ow pro…ts as relative to the value of domestic …xed costs, i.e.
for a nonexporter and 1 (z a ) =~ 1 (z a )= (w 0 ) for an exporter, respectively.
The Entry and Exit Problem of the Firm
In Melitz (2003) …rms'e¢ ciencies do not vary over time, implying that operating pro…ts are also constant through time and therefore a …rm either never exports or always exports. In this paper we depart from this outcome and, following Luttmer (2007), we assume that e¢ ciencies evolve, independently across …rms, according to
where fW a g a 0 is a standard Brownian motion, 2 R is a trend of log e¢ ciency, and 0 is the variance parameter. Changes in e¢ ciency (over the age of a …rm) can be interpreted as permanent idiosyncratic shocks to technology (i.e. producing the same variety at a lower cost) or to quality (i.e. producing a better variety at the same cost). As a result of these shocks, the …rm's optimal price, labor demand, revenues, pro…ts, and export participation evolve stochastically over time. All nonexporters have a chance of becoming exporters and some …rms do actually export. The performance of a new exporter depends on the particular realization of the e¢ ciency sample path according to equation (2) .
The decision to start exporting or to stop exporting can be analyzed following the literature on investment under uncertainty (e.g. Dixit 1989, Dixit and Pindyck 1994) . The decision to enter the foreign market presents two distinctive characteristics: …rst, it is a decision that is (partly) irreversible, in the sense that it entails sunk costs that cannot be (fully) recovered. Second, it is an investment that can be delayed, so that the …rm has the opportunity to wait for new information to arrive about its potential pro…ts before commiting resources. As such, we consider a …rm that is currently serving only the domestic market as a composite asset, part of which is the option to start exporting (i.e. making the investment). If that option is exercised, the …rm turns into a di¤erent asset, part of which is the option to stop exporting (i.e. abandon the investment). Given this circularity, the value of a nonexporter and of an exporter are interlinked, and must be determined simultaneously.
There are two state variables: the …rm e¢ ciency z and its current export participation status j, where j = 0 denotes a nonexporter while j = 1 denotes an exporting …rm. The overall state of the …rm (j; z) a¤ects the instantaneous ‡ow of pro…ts (as shown above) and the value of the option to switch trade status. The decision problem of the …rm is to switch optimally from nonexporting to exporting (and vice versa). The resulting value functions areṼ 0 (z) andṼ 1 (z), respectively. A nonexporting …rm with e¢ ciency z has valueṼ 0 (z). If the …rm decides to start exporting its value becomesṼ 1 (z). As mentioned above, this requires sustaining a sunk cost. The value function in each state, net of the cost of the switch, is the terminal payo¤ function for the other state.
Intuition suggests that a nonexporter will begin exporting when e¢ ciency (and therefore expected export sales) is high enough, and an exporter will exit the foreign market when conditions become su¢ ciently adverse. Moreover, we expect a …rm to shut down when its competitiveness is so low that it is not even worthwhile to keep an active participation in the domestic market. Therefore consider a policy to enter the foreign market at z H , exit the foreign market at z L , and shut down at z D , where z D < z L < z H . The presence of sunk costs of entry and re-entry into the export market, coupled with e¢ ciency shocks, creates a wedge between the e¢ ciency level at which …rms decide to start exporting, z H , and the e¢ ciency level at which …rms decide to stop exporting, z L . In the range of e¢ ciency levels between the thresholds z L and z H , the optimal policy is to continue with the status quo, whether it be exporting or nonexporting. The interval (z L ; z H ) is therefore a band of inaction that is endogenously determined in the model. 6 Firm's e¢ ciency is not a su¢ cient statistics to determine the export status of a …rm: a …rm's history has to be taken into account.
[ Figure 1 about here]
As an illustration, Figure 1 shows the e¢ ciency sample paths of two types of …rms. Both types start as nonexporters with e¢ ciency z. A type 1-…rm switches to export at age a H when e¢ ciency passes the z H cuto¤. After that point, we consider three possible types of realized e¢ ciency paths. First, e¢ ciency can be somewhat stable (or rise) and the …rm keeps exporting (sub-type 1A). Second, e¢ ciency can decline, even below the level at which the …rm had started exporting, z H , but not below z L , so that the …rm does not switch trade status (sub-type 1B). Third, e¢ ciency can decline below z L , and the …rm exits the export market (sub-type 1C). Eaton et al. (2008) , using …rm-level data for Colombia, …nd that "The heterogeneity in export growth conditional on survival suggests that, among …rms attaining the threshold pro…tability of operating in a new destination, there is a wide variety in export performance thereafter." The second …rm sub-type never starts to export (i.e. does not reach the z H cuto¤). After an initial rise, e¢ ciency declines (sub-type 2A and 2B), possibly to the point where it is preferable to shut down the …rm (sub-type 2B). It is important to note that between z L and z H there can be both exporters and nonexporters. To understand this status, the history of the …rm has to be taken into account. In Figure 1 , type 1 …rms with e¢ ciency z do not export when their age is below a H , but do export (at the same e¢ ciency level) when their path is that of sub-type 1C. Type 2 …rms never export when their e¢ ciency is equal to z (or above).
Before turning to a rigorous analysis of a …rm's export entry and exit decisions, we make another assumption: each …rm, at each point in time, can be hit by an exogenous shock and shut down with probability . Therefore, in this model, there are two reasons why …rms can exit: because of a negative e¢ ciency shock or because of the killing rate . Although there are some realistic examples of severe shocks that would constrain a …rm to exit independently of e¢ ciency (e.g. natural disasters, new regulation, product liability, major changes in consumers' tastes), it is also likely that exit may be caused by a series of bad shocks a¤ecting the …rm's e¢ ciency.
The entry problem 7 First, consider the problem of a nonexporter with e¢ ciency z deciding at age 0 whether to enter the export market at age a 0.
the value functions relative to the value of domestic …xed costs. 9 V 0 (z) is the current value of the …rm. At the moment of entry a the …rm pays the sunk cost I= 0 and its value switches to
where the expectation operator is conditional on the initial given value z. The …rm optimally chooses the entry moment a as follows. If the …rm enters straightaway it pays a sunk cost I= 0 and its value switches to V 1 (z): Alternatively, the …rm could stay out of the market for an in…nitesimal time, denoted by da, when its e¢ ciency has changed to (z + dz). The payo¤ from this strategy is a cash ‡ow equal to the value of current domestic pro…ts [ 0 (z) 1] da and the expected continuation value E [V 0 (z + dz)]. By Itô's Lemma we have:
where derivatives of the value functions are taken with respect to z. By Bellman's Principle of Optimality, V 0 (z) must be the best alternative, that is,
7 The problem of the …rm that we are about to analyze is also called "an optimal stopping time" problem. The reader might …nd it useful to compare the equilibrium conditions derived below with Figure 2 in section 3, where we use the calibrated parameters to plot the value functions V 0 and V 1 , as well as their di¤erence. 8 For simplicity we chose to consider the problem of a …rm at age 0. Of course, the following applies at any age of the …rm. 9 We express the value functions in terms of the domestic …xed costs in order to facilitate the comparison with Luttmer (2007) .
This gives the following conditions.
1. At all z where it is optimal to stay as a nonexporter, i.e. 8z 2 (z D ; z H ), two conditions apply. First, we have the Bellman equation,
The Bellman equation (4) makes it clear that the entitlement to the ‡ow of domestic pro…ts is an asset, and that V 0 (z) is its value. On the equation's left-hand side we have the normal return per unit of time that a decision maker (i.e. the …rm's owner), using ( + ) as the discount rate, would require for holding this asset. On the right-hand side, the …rst term is the immediate payout or dividend from the asset, while the second term is its expected rate of capital gain (or loss). Thus the right-hand side is the expected total return per unit time from holding the asset. The equality becomes a no-arbitrage or equilibrium condition, expressing the investor's willingness to hold the asset, i.e. the willingness to stay as a nonexporter. The second condition is the inequality,
which implies that the second term in the max function (3) is bigger than the …rst one.
2. Similarly, at all z where switching to exporting is optimal, i.e. 8z 2 (z H ; 1), we have two conditions. First, the inequality,
which shows that, using again the no-arbitrage interpretation introduced above, the normal return per unit of time required for holding the "non-exporting" asset is higher than its expected total return. Therefore, an investor would prefer not to hold the asset anymore, i.e. to pay the cost I= 0 , exercise the option right, and receive in return a new asset (i.e. "being an exporter") whose value is V 1 (z). The second condition (often called "the value-matching condition") implies that, over the range (z H ; 1), the …rst term in the max function in (3) is the bigger one,
Moreover, it can be shown that optimality requires that, at the threshold z H , the values V 0 (z) and V 1 (z) I= 0 , regarded as a function of z, should meet tangentially. In other words, the following "smooth pasting" condition must hold 10 :
We also assume that the scrap value of a …rm is zero, which implies that the value of a nonexporter is zero for e¢ ciency levels below the industry exit cuto¤, i.e.
for z 2 ( 1; z D ). Again, for reasons similar to those mentioned above, optimality also requires the following smooth pasting condition:
The exit problem. Now consider the problem of an exporter with e¢ ciency z deciding at age 0 whether to exit the export market at age a 0. The …rm receives pro…ts from domestic and export sales for instants s < a, and the value V 0 (z a ) at a. Therefore,
The value of an exporter, with current e¢ ciency z; is V 1 (z). The …rm must compare the payo¤ from exiting immediately with the return from continuing to export for an in…nitesimal time, da. Calculations similar to those above yield the following conditions:
1. At all z where it is optimal to keep exporting, i.e. 8z 2 (z L ; 1), we have the following Bellman equation,
and the inequality condition
2. At all z where it is optimal to exit, i.e. 8z 2 ( 1; z L ), we have the inequality condition,
and the value-matching condition,
Finally, the following smooth pasting condition applies, thus
The value function V 1 (z) must also be close to the present value of f 1 (z a ) ( 0 + 1 ) = 0 g a 0 when z 0 = z is large: when an exporter is extremely e¢ cient the option to stop exporting becomes much less valuable and the value of the …rm must then approach the present values of committing to sell both in the domestic and the foreign market forever.
The …nal condition that we need in order to be able to solve for the three e¢ ciency cuto¤s comes from assuming free entry. We assume that M E is the measure of new …rms attempting to enter into the economy per unit of time. Successful entrants (with initial e¢ ciency z larger than z D ) can start as exporters or as nonexporters. Since most new …rms start very small we prefer to assume the latter, that is, z D < z < z H . 11 Firms decide whether to enter the foreign market based on a comparison of the expected value of entry and the sunk entry cost. The free entry condition therefore takes the following form:
The value functions V 0 (z), V 1 (z), together with the three e¢ ciency cuto¤s z D , z L , and z H , will be derived in Section (2.4). Before that, in the next Section, we close the model.
Closing the model
We close the model through labor market clearing. Labor supply is …xed to L. Labor is used for creating …rms, L E , sustaining the overhead costs, L F , sustaining the variable production costs, L P and entering into the export market, L I , according to
In equilibrium, there is a measure M of active …rms. These are described by a stationary e¢ ciency density, f (z), with nonzero support over (z D ; 1) and measure M=M E . This density is equal to the sum of the e¢ ciency density of the exporters, f 1 (z), with nonzero support over (z L ; 1) and measure pM=M E , and the e¢ ciency density of nonexporters, f 0 (z), with nonzero support over (z D ; z H ) and measure (1 p) M=M E , where p denotes the (endogenous) fraction of exporters, p. Notice that, since we assume that the density f (z) has measure M=M E , it is not a probability density. The three e¢ ciency densities, f (z), f 1 (z), and f 0 (z), and their corresponding probability densities, which we call p(z), p 1 (z), and p 0 (z), will be derived in Section (2.5), where we also derive the fraction of exporters p.
12 Equation (17) above summarizes the total amount of labor used to create …rms, equal to E multiplied by the measure of potential entrants, M E . The second equation takes into account the amount of labor used to cover the domestic and export overhead costs. Recalling that the f (z) density has measure M=M E , it is easy to see that the M E R 1 z D f (z)dz term represents the measure M of active …rms. Therefore, the …rst term in equation (18) represents the total domestic overhead costs sustained by active …rms, while the second term in (18) represents the additional overhead export costs paid by the fraction p of exporting …rms. The third equation covers labor used for the production of goods sold in the domestic and foreign market. 13 The fourth equation summarizes the amount of labor used to cover the sunk entry cost of exporting by all those nonexporters that overcome the z H cuto¤. This equality will become clear below. For now, it su¢ ces to know that the set of …rms that switch to exporting is related to the measure of non-exporting …rms, as described by f 0 (z H ), that are close to the z H cuto¤.
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we can retrieve the measure 12 We de…ne the density f (z) has having measure M=M E to facilitate the comparison with Luttmer (2007). 13 It can be easily proved that the optimal demand for variable labor is X [(
for foreign sales. 14 Recall that the measure of the density
of potential entrants M E . Aggregate output is the sum of …rm revenues (see the Appendix),
In combination with the goods market clearing condition C = Y , this determines the ratio
C=w, this pins down the wage w and, using (21), Y . 15 Finally, the measure of …rms can be found using
In the next section we show how to solve for the value functions V 0 (z), and V 1 (z) together with X and the equilibrium cuto¤s z D , z L , and z H . Given these cuto¤s, in Section (2.5) we determine the equilibrium e¢ ciency density, f (z), the e¢ ciency density of the exporters f 1 (z), and the e¢ ciency density of nonexporters f 0 (z).
Valuing the Options
In this section we determine the equilibrium value functions V 0 (z) and V 1 (z), cuto¤s z D , z L , and z H , and X. The value functions V 0 (z) and V 1 (z) are general solutions to the di¤erential equations (4) and (11) . As such, the value functions can be constructed after …nding particular solutions for (4) and (11), and general solutions for the corresponding homogeneous equations. The present values of committing to sell domestically forever, W 0 (z), and committing to sell in both markets forever, W 1 (z), are two particular solutions to equations (4) and (11):
where
2 is a discount rate that takes into account the average growth rate of ‡ow pro…ts. 16 For W 0 (z) and W 1 (z) to be …nite we need the following assumption,
While r > 0 ensures that the …xed cost of operating a …rm forever is …nite (recall that wages do not grow in the steady state), this assumption ensures that the revenues of such a policy are also …nite. Overall the two assumptions guarantee that the value of a …rm is …nite. 15 Speci…cally, w = X . 16 Given the stochastic process for z described in equation (2), it can be easily shown by applying Itô's Lemma that the ‡ow of domestic pro…ts follows a geometric Brownian motion with drift
The homogeneous equations corresponding to equations (4) and (11) take the form ( + )W (z)da = E [W (z + dz)] W (z) and have solutions of the form exp( z) and exp( z), where and are positive constants,
Overall, the general solutions for V 0 (z) and V 1 (z) take the form,
for coe¢ cients (A j ; B j ) j=0;1 that remain to be determined. Note that the solutions of the homogeneous equations, incorporated in equations (23) and (24), include, respectively, the value of the option to start exporting and the value of the option to stop exporting. Since the option value to exit the export market is small for …rms with large levels of e¢ ciency, V 1 (z) has to be close to W 1 (z) for large values of z, and since is positive, it must be that B 1 = 0. The conditions (7), (9) and (14) then give rise to the boundary conditions,
where we have made explicit the dependence on all the unknown variables. The conditions above are often called the "value-matching conditions" because these match the values of the unknown functions V 0 (:), and V 1 (:) to those of the known termination payo¤, as in the case of equation (25), or because these match the values of V 0 (:) and V 1 (:) at some point on the common support, as in the case of conditions (26) and (27) . These three boundary conditions are needed to solve for the remaining three coe¢ cients A 0 , B 0 ; and A 1 , all of which are a function of X, z D , z L , and z H . The equations are linear so this can be done analytically (see the Appendix). We need four more conditions to pin down X, z D , z L , and z H . Three of these are the smooth pasting conditions (8), (10) , and (15) computed at the boundary points z D , z L , and z H . These three smooth pasting conditions require not just the values of V 0 (:), V 1 (:); and the termination payo¤, but also the derivatives of these functions, to match at the boundaries. The fourth condition comes from assuming free entry (see equation (16)). Overall, we need to solve the following system of equations:
The value functions V 1 (z) and V 0 (z) are now completely de…ned. 17 It is instructive to think about the di¤erent role played by the sunk cost I and the overhead cost 1 in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks to a …rm's e¢ ciency. Under I, nonexporters are continuously comparing the value of becoming exporters, V 1 (z) I= 0 , with the value of choosing the status quo V 0 (z). At z = z H , these two values match and nonexporters are indi¤erent between switching to export and continuing with the status quo. If z rises above z H it becomes strictly preferable to export. However, if, as a consequence of a series of negative shocks, z falls below z H exporters do not switch their status (even if current export pro…ts are negative) because the payo¤s to be compared are now di¤erent: the value of exiting the export market is V 0 (z) and the value of choosing the status quo is
, since the export entry cost I= 0 has already been sunk. When there are no sunk export costs but only overhead export costs (i.e. I is replaced by 1 ), the value of becoming an exporter, being always V 1 (z), does not depend on the …rm current export status. In this case, the cuto¤s z L and z H coincide and …rms start and stop exporting at this unique e¢ ciency threshold.
Equilibrium E¢ ciency Densities
This section shows how to determine the equilibrium e¢ ciency densities f (z), f 0 (z), and f 1 (z) and the corresponding probability densities p(z), p 0 (z), and p 1 (z).
The overall e¢ ciency density, f (z). As mentioned above, at each point in time, there is a measure M E of new …rms that enter with e¢ ciency z 0 = z. Consider the life of one of these …rms. After entering at z, this …rm's e¢ ciency evolves, as the …rm ages, according to the stochastic process speci…ed in equation (2) . This means that, for each age level a of the …rm, there is a corresponding e¢ ciency density describing how likely it is that the …rm reaches a particular e¢ ciency level z a . The following partial di¤erential equation, also known as the 17 It can be helpful to brie ‡y compare this dynamic programming problem to the one analyzed by Dixit (1989) . Our problem nests Dixit's 1989 model, with two main di¤erences. First, besides an entry and an exit cuto¤ (z H and z L , respectively), we need to determine a second exit cuto¤ (z D ). This explains the presence of the additional value-matching and smooth pasting conditions (25) and (28) . Second, while in Dixit (1989) the …rm's cash ‡ow from the investment only depends on the Brownian motion variable, in our setting it also depends on X, which can be interpreted as a proxy for market size. This is why we need an extra condition, namely the free entry condition, (16) , in order to pin down the level of the cash ‡ow.
"Kolmogorov forward equation", allows us to …nd precisely such a density function, which we denote as f (a; z).
for all a > 0 and z > z D . The …rst term on the right-hand side of equation (32) re ‡ects the exogenous exit of …rms. The remaining two terms describe how the density f (a; z) evolves as a result of changes in the e¢ ciency of a …rm. There are two constraints that we want to impose on f (a; z). The …rst is straightforward. As the …rm's age goes to zero, the e¢ ciency distribution implied by f (a; z) must approach the e¢ ciency distribution among entrants. Since g(:) is degenerate at z, this condition is
Second, following the optimal strategy of the …rm outlined in section (2.2), we require that there are no active …rms with e¢ ciency equal to the exit threshold z D , i.e,
for all a > 0. The solution to equation (32) , subject to the boundary conditions (33)- (34) , is f (a; z) = e a (a; zj z);
for all a > 0 and all z > z D , where
and (:) is the standard normal density. 19 Now we can make a second thought experiment and switch from a "one-…rm/time-series" approach to a "multiple …rms/cross-sectional" view. In the steady state of the economy outlined above, …rms enter and exit at constant aggregate rates in such a way that the aggregate measure of …rms, M , does not change. There is a continuum of in…nitesimal …rms. The underlying stochastic structure is assumed to be such that probability distributions for individual …rm e¢ ciency can be interpreted as cross-sectional distributions for the whole continuum of …rms. In other words, we can interpret f (a; z), described above, as a stationary density over e¢ ciency and age describing the set of …rms that are active in the equilibrium. More precisely, let 18 Note that age increases deterministically with a unit drift (and no variance f (a; z)M E be the density, over e¢ ciency and age, characterizing the set of …rms that are active in the steady state. Since M is the measure of …rms, f (a; z)M E has measure M=M E . Each …rm that is active in the steady state is characterized by an e¢ ciency level z and an age level a. Each of these …rms has entered at z. Their e¢ ciency has evolved according to di¤erent realizations of equation (2) . Some …rms have exited at z D , others at e¢ ciency levels above z D as a consequence of having been hit by the exogenous shock with probability . The set of exiting …rms has been replaced by a new cohort of …rms entering at z. The e¢ ciency density for each cohort of age a is described as f (a; z). The marginal density of f (a; z) with respect to z describes the e¢ ciency of all the …rms, independently from which cohort they belong to:
are positive constants. We need the following,
to guarantee that the mean of the equilibrium stationary distribution for exp(z) is …nite. 20 The intuition for the above assumption is that, as long as the killing rate, , is high enough, the distribution has a …nite mean even if the drift is positive. Recall that f (z) is not a probability density. In the appendix we derive the normalizing constant that is needed to transform the density f (z) into the probability density p(z). 21 Note an important di¤erence between our framework and Melitz (2003) : in his case a …rm's exit is linked to the constant exogenous probability of …rm death, , and, therefore, the exit process does not a¤ect the shape of the equilibrium e¢ ciency distribution, which inherits the characteristics of the entrants'e¢ ciency distribution g(z) (typically assumed to be a Pareto distribution). In our model, the probability of exiting from the foreign market is correlated with the …rm's e¢ ciency, and therefore this probability does a¤ect the equilibrium e¢ ciency distribution. A stationary 20 The proof that the above condition is needed to ensure a …nite mean is available upon request. 21 We can now provide a more detailed explanation of the labor demand equation (20) . The measure of non-exporting …rms that switch to export is intuitively equal to the ‡ow of …rms that pass the z H cuto¤ from below. In order to compute this, it is then necessary to use the density f 0 (z) and its evolution over time. As explained in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , the evolution of such a density is described by a Kolmogorov equation. It is possible to write a Kolmogorov equation similar to equation (32) for f 0 (a; z). The right-hand side of such a Kolmogorov equation describes exactly what happens to the density of nonexporting …rms, for each (a; z) pair, as time goes by. Since we are interested in the total ‡ow of …rms that passes in an interval centered at z H , we need to integrate the right-hand side of the Kolmogorov equation over z and a and evaluate it at z H . Therefore we obtain, recalling also that f 0 (z H ) = 0, the e¢ ciency distribution exists because new …rms continuously enter the economy. Below we show that the upper tail of the e¢ ciency (and size) density is nonetheless Pareto, consistent with the empirical evidence.
The e¢ ciency density for exporters, f 1 (z). Each …rm that is active in the steady state is also characterized by a trade status j. Firms transition from j = 0 to j = 1 (i.e. switch from nonexporting to exporting) when their e¢ ciency reaches z H and transition from j = 1 to j = 0 (i.e. switch from exporting to nonexporting) when their e¢ ciency crosses z L from above. At any point in time a fraction p of …rms is exporting. The measure of exporters, pM , is described by the density f 1 (z) (or by the corresponding probability density p 1 (z)) that can be easily obtained following similar steps as those outlined above, but now with entry and exit points z H and z L instead of z and z D ,
Finally, the density f 0 (z) for the …rms that do not export is equal to the di¤erence between f (z) and f 1 (z).
Probability densities. As in Luttmer (2007) , the equilibrium probability density of exp(z) is Pareto in the upper tail with shape coe¢ cient . 22 The probability density of exp(z) for exporters is also Pareto in the upper tail with shape coe¢ cient . 23 Since both a …rm's exports and (variable) labor demand are proportional to exp(z), a simple change of variable establishes the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Both the probability density of export sales and of …rm size are Pareto, with tail index = ( 1), in the upper tail.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Eaton et al. (2011), using data from France, report that export sales distributions behave similarly to a Pareto distribution in the upper tail and more like a lognormal distribution in the lower tail independently of market size and extent of French participation. Export sales distributions are therefore similar to the overall …rm size distribution, which the industry dynamics literature has already shown to be Pareto in the upper tail (e.g. Axtell 2001 , Luttmer 2007 ). Proposition 1 therefore shows that in our model both the export sales distribution and the size distribution of …rms preserve the same qualitative features observed in the data. Proposition 1 will prove to be handy below when we calibrate the model to the U.S. economy. 22 Speci…cally, when
1 . 23 Precisely, when z > z H the probability density p 1 (z) becomes A 1 exp( z) where
Using the probability densities p(z) and p 1 (z), it is easy to show that the fraction of exporters is equal to
The intuition for the …rst equality is the following. Along the (z H ; 1) range, both the overall e¢ ciency probability density p(z) and the probability density for exporters p 1 (z) are positive.
Since along this range all …rms are exporters, the ratio between p(z) and p 1 (z) should be equal to the fraction of exporter, p.
Numerical Analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to match relevant statistics of …rms'turnover and export dynamics for the U.S. economy, and explore its properties numerically. We perform this analysis in order to provide an estimate of the sunk and overhead costs of exporting, to quantify the band of inaction, and analyze how di¤erent forms of trade liberalization (e.g. reduction in sunk or overhead trade costs) a¤ect selection and persistence in export status. The equilibrium system (28)- (31) in the four endogenous variables z D ; z L , z H and X features 13 parameters that must be calibrated: , , , , L, z, , , E , 0 , 1 , and I. The discount rate is equal to the interest rate in steady state, thus we set it to 0:05; as standard in the business cycle literature. Using U.S. Census 2004 data, we set to 0:09; to match the average annual death rate for enterprises in manufacturing observed in the 1998-2004 period. 24 We set = 7:69 to match a markup of 15 percent, an intermediate value in the range of estimates reported in Basu (1996) . 25 We set = 1:3, to match 30 percent variable trade costs, in line with values in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2001). We normalize the population level L to 1 and the common entry level e¢ ciency z to 2, without loss of generality.
Brownian motion parameters. The parameters of the Brownian motion, and , can be calibrated in the following way. The model implies that the average growth rate of variable employment conditional on survival is a function of and ,
This relies on the fact that employment varies, in the model, only because of the e¢ ciency 24 For each year the death rates are computed as follows: taking year 2000 as an example, the death rate is the ratio of …rms dead between March 2000 and March 2001 to the total number of …rms in March 2000. The data can be downloaded at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/data.html. 25 Anderson and Wincoop (2004) reports estimates of the elasticity of substitution between 5 and 10, hence our calibrated value is in this range. 26 See the Appendix.
shocks. 27 The U.S. Census data compiled by the Small Business Administration show that employment among …rms with 500 or more employees grows at an annual rate of 0:0036 over the 1988-2006 period (Luttmer, 2012) . We need a second equation in the two unknowns and . The model predicts a stationary employment distribution that is Pareto in the upper tail with tail index = ( 1) (Proposition 1). Using the de…nition of in equation (36), we can …nd a second relationship between and ,
The employment size distribution of U.S. …rms is stable over time and close to Pareto for …rms with more than 20 employees. A point estimate of the tail index = ( 1) is about 1:06 (Luttmer, 2007 and 2012 ), which we use to calibrate obtaining the value 7:093. Hence, solving the two equations above with respect to and leads to
Using the calibrated values for , , we obtain the values = 0:2459 and = 0:2019. Overhead and sunk costs. Parameters E , 0 , 1 , and I are jointly calibrated to match the following four key statistics of the U.S. economy. Djankov et al. (2002) …nd that the total regulatory entry cost for the United States in 1999 were 1:6 percent of GDP per capita. This statistics is particularly relevant for the sunk entry cost, since in the model total entry costs as a share of income are
where m 1 stands for the …rst moment/target used in the calibration, and M E , w, and Y are derived in Section 2.3. Using 2004 U.S. Census data we …nd that the average death rate of small enterprises (i.e. between one and nine workers) is 11:74 percent in the period 1998-2004: we target this moment since it is particularly relevant for the …xed operating cost 0 . In terms of the model this second moment is 28 m 2 = 1 2
Note that the closer the exit cuto¤ z D is to the entry point z, the higher is the chance that …rms will eventually exit because of a sequence of bad e¢ ciency shocks, and therefore, the higher is m 2 . Bernard and Jensen (2004a) using U.S. Census data show that 12:6 percent of exporters become nonexporters on average in the period 1984-1992. We choose this as a target in calibrating the …xed operating cost of exporting 1 and the sunk cost I. In the model the percentage of exporting …rms ceasing to export is
Again, note that the closer the entry point z H is to the export exit cuto¤ z L , the higher is the chance that exporters will eventually stop exporting because of a sequence of bad e¢ ciency shocks, and therefore, the higher is m 3 . Finally Bernard et al. (2003) …nd that 21 percent of U.S. manufacturing …rms in the 1992 Census data are exporters. This is our additional target for the sunk cost of exporting I and overhead costs 1 . This fourth target in the model is represented by m 4 = p, where the fraction of exporters p is de…ned in equation (38).
Calibration …t. These targeted moments are enough to identify the four parameters E , 0 , 1 , and I only up to a scale factor. The calibrated parameters E , 0 , 1 , and I are such that the predicted moments are fairly close to the actual ones, as shown in Table 1 below.
[ Table 1 about here]
The calibrated parameter values show two interesting features. First, the sunk cost of starting up a …rm, E , is about 20 times higher than the sunk cost of exporting, I, for an existing …rm. Second, the export overhead cost, 1 , is about 2:5 times higher than the domestic counterpart, 0 . Both results are reasonable. Setting up a …rm is probably a much harder task than entering a foreign market as an already established business. Moreover, the cost of maintaining a presence in the foreign market is likely to be higher than the cost of maintaining a presence in the domestic market.
The calibration …t and, therefore, the above results are invariant to a proportional rescaling of the four cost parameters, E , 0 , 1 , and I. Since the di¤erent types of …xed exporting costs play a key role in this paper, it could be insightful to provide U.S. dollar values for these costs and compare them with existing estimates. With the aid of an extra moment we can provide an approximate estimate of the …xed costs. Irarrazabal et al. (2009) show that the export overhead cost for Norwegian …rms ranges between $1; 439 and $13; 118 with an average across destinations of $5; 202 in 1992 dollars. 30 We can use the …gures above as an approximate reference for the value of 1 in our model and get an idea of the dollar value of the sunk export cost I. If we constrain the value in dollars of 1 to approximate the average export overhead 29 See the Appendix. 30 See Table 3 cost …gure in Norwegian data, the export sunk cost predicted by our model is $476; 726. 31 Das et al. (2007) estimate the …xed cost to enter the export market for a few relevant manufacturing sectors in Colombia, …nding values ranging from $416; 584 to $520; 730, which are close to our prediction. 32 In the top two panels of Figure 2 we use the calibrated parameters to plot the value of a nonexporting …rm, V 0 (z), and of an exporter, V 1 (z), de…ned in Section 2.2 and 2.4, both as a function of e¢ ciency z. We also show the thresholds z D , z L , and z H . Since the value functions increase very rapidly as z approaches the export entry cuto¤ z H ; we …rst show a plot of V 0 (z) and V 1 (z) for z between z D and a value slightly above z L (top-left panel), and then plot the same functions for values of e¢ ciency close to z H (top-right panel). As expected, V 0 (z) and V 1 (z) are both increasing in z, they have the same value for z z L as stated by the equilibrium condition (14) , and they depart for z > z L where V 1 (z) > V 0 (z), as stated by the equilibrium condition (12) . The bottom-left panel of Figure 2 shows the di¤erence between V 1 (z) and V 0 (z). Along the [z L ; z H ] interval, we can interpret this di¤erence as the …rm's incremental value of being an exporter, that is, how much more it is worth when it sells in the foreign market than when it does not. As required by conditions (7) and (14) derived in Section 2.2, such an incremental value is zero at z L and equals the sunk cost of exporting, I= 0 , at z H . Moreover, as required by conditions (8) and (15), the slope of V 1 (z) and V 0 (z) is the same at the thresholds z L and z H .
[ Figure 2 about here] Figure 3 depicts the stationary distributions of e¢ ciency by export status. We show the overall e¢ ciency distribution, p(z), and the distribution for exporters, p 1 (z).
[ Figure 3 about here]
First, notice that both distributions, as shown analytically in Section 2.5, are Pareto in the upper tail. Given the assumptions on the production function and preferences, this implies that also the corresponding sales and size distributions are Pareto in the upper tail, as described in 31 The dollar values of each …xed cost can be computed as follows,
where F C = ( E ; 0 , 1 , I) is the vector of the costs as a share of income in the model. Y
U S
1992 is U.S. GDP in 1992, equal to 6:29 trillions (Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1), which is chosen because for many of the calibration targets we used 1992 U.S. Census data from Bernard et al. (2003) . Since, the calibration focuses on …rm-level data in manufacturing, we use the manufacturing share of GDP m U S 1992 as a measure of the size of the economy. In 1992 the percentage of U.S. GDP coming from manufacturing is about 18:3 (World Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators). 32 Since their data are in 1986 dollars we have used the U.S. GDP de ‡ator to convert to 1992 dollars, to facilitate comparison. Proposition 1. As mentioned above, this is consistent with evidence from …rm-level data (e.g. Axtell 2001 , and Eaton et al. 2011) . The kink at z = z for p(z) is a result of …rm entry that takes place at z. Similarly, the kink at z = z H for p 1 (z) is a result of the entry into export that takes place at z H .
Second, the interval (z L ; z H ) describes a wide band of inaction where the distribution of exporters and nonexporters overlap, i.e. some exporters are less e¢ cient than some nonexporters. This comes to grips with plant level facts (for example Bernard et al. 2003) . Eaton et al. (2011) , introducing …rm-(and market-) speci…c …xed cost and demand shocks into a static framework, also provide a model that is consistent with overlapping exporter and nonexporter distributions. In our model, the overlap instead is due to e¢ ciency shocks and sunk export entry costs, leading each single …rm to start and stop exporting at di¤erent z levels. This is consistent with Bernard and Jensen (2004b) who, using U.S. data for the 1984-92 period to track …rms over time, …nd that …rms start and stop exporting at di¤erent productivity levels, with exporters exiting at a productivity level one-third below the productivity level at which …rms start exporting. Moreover, they …nd that …rms exiting from the export market show a comparable deterioration of their productivity levels. In our benchmark calibration the e¢ -ciency di¤erence between entrants and exiting …rms in the export market is substantial as well: the z H =z L ratio is approximately 1:4, suggesting that exiting exporters lose about 29 percent of the e¢ ciency they had at entry.
Another way to reconcile the presence of a wide band of inaction with the data is in terms of persistence in export status. The literature on hysteresis (e.g. Baldwin and Krugman 1989) has advanced the idea that nonexporters must incur a sunk entry cost in order to enter the foreign market. Roberts and Tybout (1997) …nd strong evidence for the presence of sunk costs and conclude that prior export experience increases the probability of exporting by as much as 60 percentage points. Bernard and Jensen (2004a) , using data for U.S. plants, …nd that the percentage of exporters in 1984 who were also exporters in 1985 is 85 percent. In our baseline calibration the share of exporters that keep exporting between two periods is very close, being about 87 percent.
Globalization Scenarios
In this section we explore the model further by studying and comparing the implications of reductions in the two types of …xed trade costs: the sunk export entry cost I, and the overhead export cost 1 . This is a relevant exercise since these barriers are isomorphic in the standard Melitz (2003) model. In the two cases analyzed below, the initial steady state is the one of the baseline calibration described in the previous section. We start by considering the e¤ects of a 10 percent reduction in the sunk export entry cost I.
[ Figure 4 about here]
The top three panels of Figure 4 report the change (to be read from right to left) of the three cuto¤s, z D , z L , and z H . The intuition behind these movements is as follows: When the sunk export entry cost decreases, uncertainty about future e¢ ciency matters less. An exporter that receives a bad shock is more likely to stop exporting. The risk of having to repay the sunk cost in the future is less important because the magnitude of this cost is lower. This intuition explains the increase in z L . Similarly, a nonexporter that receives a positive shock is more likely to start exporting since it is now easier and less risky to cover the sunk cost with future export revenues. This explains the decrease in z H . Finally, the increase in the z D cuto¤ has the same explanation as in Melitz (2003) : the increased labor demand by the more e¢ cient …rms and new entrants bids up the real wage and forces the least e¢ cient …rms to exit. In a nutshell, when the sunk export entry cost is reduced, it is easier for a nonexporter to become an exporter, it is easier for an exporter to stop exporting, and it is more di¢ cult for less e¢ cient …rms to survive. Given the reduction in z H and the increase in z L , the band of inaction narrows. The status quo therefore becomes a less frequent choice, and hysteresis in exporting becomes more attenuated. The bottom central panel of Figure 4 shows that the share of exporters that exit the foreign market increases, i.e. export participation becomes less persistent. Finally, the share of exporters (out of all active …rms) increases. This result is not straightforward since, as mentioned above, on the one hand, it becomes easier to put in place the investments needed to enter the foreign market (z H decreases) but, on the other hand, it also becomes easier to exit those markets whenever conditions get worse (z L increases). The former margin dominates quantitatively leading to a larger share of exporters.
[ Figure 5 about here] Figure 5 shows what happens to the key variables of the model when the overhead export cost 1 is reduced by 10 percent. The top panel shows that both the export entry cuto¤ z H and the export exit cuto¤ z L decrease while the exit cuto¤ z D increases. The movement in the latter can be explained along the same lines as before. The intuition for the change in z L and z H instead is the following. When the overhead export cost decreases, exporters, conditional on their current e¢ ciency level, enjoy higher pro…ts from their current sales and are more likely to be able to cover the …xed trade cost in the future as well. This explains why z L decreases. On the contrary, nonexporters are more likely to receive a positive shock to e¢ ciency that is big enough to make it pro…table to start exporting. This explains why also z H decreases. The band of inaction, measured by z H z L , widens as the reduction in z L is larger than the reduction in z H . The intuition for the di¤erence in the rate of reduction of z H and z L is that the decision to start exporting is less sensitive to a change in the overhead export cost once a sunk export cost is in place. As a consequence, z H decreases when 1 does but not as fast as z L . Since the band of inaction is now wider, those …rms that already export are less likely to stop doing so, leading to more hysteresis in exporting. The bottom central panel of Figure 5 therefore shows a decrease in the share of exporters that become nonexporters. When the export overhead cost decreases, it is easier to start exporting but the decision to stop becomes less obvious. Finally, as in the previous case, the share of exporters increases. This time this is a less ambiguous result since both export cuto¤s decrease.
Overall, the main di¤erence between a reduction in the sunk export entry cost I and the export overhead cost 1 is its e¤ect on the band of inaction and therefore on the persistency of the export status. Trade liberalization via a reduction in sunk export costs reduces hysteresis, while the opposite happens when liberalization takes place through a reduction in overhead export costs. The new exporters margin, the increase in the share of exporters produced by trade liberalization, is about 10 percent with a reduction of I and about 1 percent with a reduction of 1 .
Conclusions
In this paper we introduce persistent idiosyncratic e¢ ciency shocks in a continuous-time model of trade with heterogeneous …rms. We show that the presence of sunk export entry costs and e¢ ciency uncertainty gives rise to hysteresis in export market participation and provides a framework to study export dynamics in a general equilibrium environment. In our model, a …rm's e¢ ciency is not a su¢ cient statistics for its export status since a …rm's export decisions are history-dependent. Firms start exporting at a certain e¢ ciency level, but may remain in the foreign market even after their e¢ ciency has fallen below the level it was at when they entered the market. Moreover, the model re ‡ects features of …rm birth, growth, and export market entry and exit observed in the data.
A calibrated version of the model is used to provide estimates of the size of the sunk cost of exporting, and of a …rm's persistence in export status. Moreover, numerical simulations are used to show how di¤erent modes of globalization, in the form of a reduction in the sunk export entry cost as opposed to a reduction in the export overhead cost, a¤ect …rms' selection and persistence in export status. In this sense, our model formalizes a very natural link between two branches of the literature: the literature on hysteresis, focusing on explaining why the same trade and exchange rate policies can have strikingly di¤erent e¤ects in di¤erent countries or time periods, and the new trade theory, emphasizing the selection e¤ects of trade policies.
One limitation of our theoretical and quantitative analysis is the focus on trade among symmetric countries. This implies, for instance, that we cannot explore the e¤ects of unilateral trade liberalization episodes on …rm's selection and on the persistence in export status. Moreover, a symmetric country model cannot be used to explain the substantial variation in export entry (across markets) and in sales conditional on entering a market found in the data (e.g. Eaton et al., 2011) . In on-going research, we are exploring a number of extensions of our framework, including the case of multiple asymmetric countries. 
Share of exporters: m 4
Source: Authors'calculations.
Appendix
Value Matching Conditions
The three value-matching conditions of equations (25), (26) , and (27) can be used to solve for the three constants, A 0 , A 1 , and B 0 ; as a function of the three cuto¤s, z D , z L , z H , and X. The three smooth pasting conditions and the free entry condition of equations (28), (29), (30) , and (31) can then be used to solve for z D , z l , z H , and of X. We can rewrite the three value-matching conditions as The …rst condition can be solved for A 0 ,
Inserting the above into the second value-matching condition we get
Now inserting both the expression for A 0 and the one for A 1 in the third value-matching condition we get B 0 as a function of z L , z H , X:
It is then easy to get A 0 and A 1 .
Aggregate Output
Aggregate output is the sum of revenues for all exporting and non-exporting …rm. Recalling that, under our assumptions, ‡ow pro…ts are a fraction 1= of revenues,
The probability densities are thus 
5.0.5 Export Sales and Size Probability Density (Proposition 1)
The proof of Proposition 1 is the following. Export sales, r 1 (z), for a …rm with e¢ ciency z are The probability density is
where p 1 (z) is the probability density of z for exporting …rms. Using (40), when z z H , this expression can be rewritten as
showing that the density is proportional to y v 1 1 , therefore being Pareto distributed in the upper tail.
The proof for the size probability density p l (y) is analogous since variable employment, just like sales, is proportional to exp(( 1) z).
Calibration Moments
Average Growth Rate of Variable Employment Conditional on Survival Note that variable labor demand is l 0 (z) = X [( 1) = ] exp (( 1) z) for a nonexporter and l 1 (z) = (1 + ) l 0 (z) for an exporter. Itô's Lemma and the stochastic process for z, described in (2) , imply that the stochastic process for variable labor employment is a geometric Brownian motion with drift ( 1) + 0:5 ( 1) 2 2 l 0 (z) for nonexporters and with drift 
Average Death Rate of Small Firms
Recall that equation (20) implies that the measure of nonexporters that switch to export is 0:5(1 p)M 2 @p 0 (z H )=@z. By analogy, the measure of nonexporters that shut down is 0:5(1 p)M 2 @p 0 (z D )=@z or, as a fraction of the measure of nonexporters,
The derivative is determined as following. Since p(z) = (1 p)p 0 (z) + p 1 (z)p;
it is true that
Then, using (39) for z D < z < z < z H , we obtain 
The fraction of nonexporters that shut down is
Percentage of Exporters Becoming Nonexporters
Following similar steps as above, the measure of exporters that become nonexporters is 0:5M p 2 @p 1 (z L )=@z or, as a fraction of the measure of exporters,
The derivative is determined as following. Using equation (40) for z D < z < z H ,
The fraction of exporters that become nonexporters is therefore
Percentage of Exporters
This moment can be easily derived recalling that
and using equations (39) and (40).
